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Although the term Cultural Heritage 
carries a rather positive connotation—
bringing together notions such as safe-
guarding and human creativity—critical 
investigations have underlined the vari-
ous strategic, economic and political ra-
tionalities inscribed in this term.
In 2010 UNESCO categorized the Alevi 
ritual sequence, semah, as Intangible 
Cultural Heritage and as such it was in-
scribed in the Turkish National Inventory 
for Intangible Cultural Heritage, al-
though Alevis are oftentimes marginal-
ized by the Turkish state due to its Sunni-
Turkist conception of belonging. The 
celebration of an Alevi ritual as enrich-
ing Turkey’s “cultural diversity” thus ne-
cessitated an analytical approach that 
comes to terms with the tension be-
tween this formal recognition, ongoing 
political surveillance, and the very spe-
cific notions of diversity that have been 
put into play. With reference to Fou-
cault’s (as well as Rose’s) analysis of con-
temporary government as “govern-
mentality,” Cultural Heritage can be 
grasped in its ambivalent (but not nec-
essarily conflicting) form of govern­
mental liberation and control. The paper 
thus enlarges the analytical scale of think-
ing about Cultural Heritage in its correla-
tion with identity-formation, as well as the 
politics of recognition and governance.
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Introduction: Governmentalities of Heritage
UNESCO has taken up a number of new 
measures since the beginning of the mil-
lennium in its endeavor to safeguard the 
Cultural Heritage of humanity. While for-
mer UNESCO activities on Cultural Heri-
tage were exclusively directed at “tangi-
ble” cultural and “natural” sites, the more 
recent steps were taken in order to en-
hance an awareness of Intangible Cultural 
Heritage (or ICH), such as oral traditions, 
rituals, or traditional crafts. A former focus 
on monumental heritage and natural sites 
was criticized by scholars and practi tioners 
as paying too little attention to diverse and 
multiple forms of human creativity, which 
are expressed in a variety of practices and 
traditions (Coombe 375). Accordingly, the 
shift to ICH is:
recognizing that communities, in partic-
ular indigenous communities, groups 
and, in some cases, individuals, play an 
important role in the production, safe-
guarding, maintenance and re-creation 
of the intangible cultural heritage, thus 
helping to enrich cultural diversity and 
human creativity. (UNESCO Conven-
tion)
The UNESCO Convention for the Safe-
guarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage 
places the bearers of the particular tradi-
tions in the center of any safeguarding ac-
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tivity—which, according to Merkel, “can be 
understood as a sincere attempt to con-
tribute to their empowerment and to cor-
rect earlier elitist approaches” (68). Other 
scholars underline the importance of ICH 
for the formation and assurance of group 
identities (Wulf 86) or its capacity for en-
abling “vernacular” groups to figure in an 
“agentive way to act upon one’s own 
world” (Brosius and Polit 2).
In 2010, the Alevi semah-dance—a se-
quence from the cem-ritual1—was declared 
to be ICH and as such inscribed in the 
Turkish National Inventory for Intangible 
Cultural Heritage as “fostering and enrich-
ing traditional music culture of Turkey” 
(UNESCO Nomination file 6). Alevis make 
up about 15 to 30% of Turkey’s population, 
yet are not legally recognized as a reli-
gious community in their own, as Sunni-
Turkist notions of belonging were—and 
still are—salient in many aspects of Turkish 
polities and politics. The recognition of an 
Alevi ritual as Cultural Heritage, enriching 
Turkey’s “cultural diversity,” thus begs an 
analytical approach capable of encom-
passing Alevi aspirations for recognition, 
underlying governmental understandings 
of nationhood and diversity, and their mu-
tual interrelations.
Therefore, this paper analyzes Cultural 
Heritage as a tool for the assemblage of 
governance and “diversity management.” 
In order to grasp both the aspect of safe-
guarding and empowerment, as well as 
the particular (and most likely nationalist) 
notion of cultural difference that heritage 
policies enact, I consider it useful to draw 
upon an idea of government that captures 
some ratio of the liberating and limiting 
modes of political intervention vis-à-vis 
the population. The late Michel Foucault 
and his successors, particularly Nikolas 
Rose, have characterized contemporary 
government less in terms of ruling by law 
or discipline. Dissociating the exercise of 
political power from domination, they em-
phasize how (neo)liberal forms of conduct 
rather shape, guide, direct, or govern pop-
ulations by recognizing and enhancing 
the individual’s capacity for acting upon 
him- or herself (Foucault, Biopolitik 97). 
Since liberalism requires individual free-
dom of the subject, the government’s re-
sponsibility is not to suppress, but rather 
to promote certain forms of subjectivity: 
Accordingly, laissez faire and freedom are 
perceived of as a specific way of political 
economy or political intervention rather 
than the “antithesis of government” (Rose 
69). The way in which Foucault and Rose 
consider freedom to be a form of political 
conduct can inform an analysis of the pol-
itics on Cultural Heritage and its liberal no-
tions of empowerment in several ways: 
The focus on empowerment of “vernacu-
lar groups” in ICH discourse on the one 
hand, and Alevism as a socio-religious 
problem of (nationalist/Islamist/neoliber-
al) government on the other requires a 
way of thinking that must come to terms 
with the ostensible tension between and 
alleged binary equations of liberation and 
control, inclusion and exclusion, empow-
erment and containment.
This paper seeks to analyze the emer-
gence of—or, better put, the construction 
of—an Alevi heritage in Turkey as such a 
form of political conduct, which on the 
one hand meets the Alevi communities’ 
aspirations for recognition. Yet the charac-
ter of the strategies and technologies ap-
plied, in concert with UNESCO as power-
ful actor in the assemblage of government, 
render very specific political understand-
ings and mentalities of cultural difference 
to be legible, firm, and true. This way of 
thinking about government—in terms of 
the relation of specific political knowledge 
embodied in any political action or strat-
egy—is called “governmentality.” It is my 
argument that references to Cultural Heri-
tage may indeed forge coherence within 
the groups concerned—which would be 
desirable under liberal notions of citizen-
ship and minority issues. Yet the language 
of UNESCO and the specific understand-
ing of diversity it enacts prescribe to the 
communities a knowledge about them-
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selves as being commodified and of “do-
mesticated diversity” (Göner 127), which 
severely limits their capacities for both po-
litical participation and resistance.
Methodological Considerations
Many scholars have emphasized how her-
itage regimes, with their complex array of 
actors—heritage promoters of civil “indig-
enous” groups, national politicians and 
bureaucrats, intergovernmental regimes—
bring to bear new forms of political con-
duct and subjectivity (Harrison 7; Tau-
schek 20). Hall highlights the evaluating 
character of Cultural Heritage policies as 
inherently classifying and arranging: Her-
itage thus represents not only the desire 
and practice of preserving certain aspects 
of the past, but constitutes “the symbolic 
power to order knowledge, to rank, clas-
sify and arrange, and thus to give mean-
ing to objects and things through inter-
pretative schemas” (88). These particular 
formations of knowledge and mentalities 
of government are embodied in the in-
struments, strategies, and politics ap-
plied. The approach of a governmentality 
of heritage tries to grasp this interrelation 
of knowledge and power, and the spe-
cific governmental understandings that 
are inscribed in political strategies, prac-
tices, and programs (Rose 2). Therefore, 
this approach relies on discourse analysis 
and takes for granted the inventive char-
acter of language and any conceptual 
practice for reality—a reality that is of 
course always a specific political reality, 
which makes things and objects govern-
able or that constitutes them as a problem 
to be acted upon.
This analysis of the governmentalities of 
an Alevi heritage in Turkey thus investi-
gates the notions and governmental un-
derstandings of religious and cultural dif-
ference and belonging that produce the 
political practice. Neither does it ask, for 
example, if an empowering element of 
heritage policies succeeded or not, nor is 
it a hermeneutical investigation of the 
“real objectives behind a certain strategy” 
(Rose 56). Rather, such an analysis at-
tempts to grasp the practices’ own ac-
counts of reality by scrutinizing the forms 
of political order and subjectivity that are 
enacted by this governmental knowl-
edge and by the political strategies it in-
forms. As policies on Cultural Heritage 
rely on classification and arrangement, it 
is asked what kinds of operations are un-
dertaken to render an Alevi ritual practice 
into Cultural Heritage of a polity that con-
tinuously reproduces Sunni-Turkist ideas 
of nationhood.
An important and analytically powerful as-
pect of governmentality analysis is its un-
derstanding of government as an “assem-
blage” (Coombe 379) of multiple, 
decentralized practices of conduct, which 
makes it possible to grasp intersecting na-
tional and transnational governmental 
forces (Turkey – UNESCO), as well as the 
subjects that act in this field of discursive 
possibilities and constraints. An analysis of 
governmentality also considers the cre-
ative ways in which subjects take up initia-
tives and behave toward these political 
strategies. Governing, in this sense, is the 
art of combining techniques of domina-
tion and freedom and an ability to set pro-
cesses into motion “through which the self 
is constructed or modified by himself” 
(Foucault, “Hermeneutics” 204).
Intangible Cultural Heritage, which explic-
itly addresses the bearers of objects and 
practices that are to be turned into heri-
tage, not only acknowledges “the impor-
tance of communities, in particular indig-
enous communities” in the creation and 
reproduction of the heritage of humanity 
(UNESCO Convention), but also considers 
ICH to be inherently “community based”: 
intangible cultural heritage can only be 
heritage when it is recognized as such 
by the communities, groups or indivi-
duals that create, maintain and transmit 
it—without their recognition, nobody 
else can decide for them that a given 
expression or practice is their heritage. 
(UNESCO Heritage)2
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This form of governance thus also relies 
on the activity of these “communities, 
groups or individuals” to decide on their 
own terms about their Cultural Heritage, 
which contributes to the notion of heri-
tage as empowering these communities 
vis-à-vis state actors (Merkel; Wulf; Brosius 
and Polit). An analysis of the governmen-
talities of heritage investigates the ways in 
which government shapes its subjects’ as-
pirations of recognition and harnesses 
their capacity for self-directed conduct to 
meet certain political ends. The question 
at stake here is how, for example, forms of 
knowledge and “interpretive schemas” 
(Hall 88) on Cultural Heritage are adopted 
by these groups and individuals taking up 
the UNESCO language of heritage and its 
underlying notion of empowerment to 
foster construction of their identities. 
What kind of subjectivity, what kind of po-
litical order and what concepts of the na-
tion are portrayed in these aspirations for 
identity, and struggles for recognition and 
belonging?
I certainly do not deny the emotional value 
of ICH and its potential for preserving 
threatened practices and objects for the 
purpose of safeguarding and constructing 
identities. The analysis taken up here also 
does not aim to deconstruct Alevi Cultural 
Heritage as a mere strategic tool made up 
by bureaucrats to meet certain ends. Like-
wise, the specific form of political conduct 
called governmentality does not deny a 
possibly emotional value of heritage, but 
rather makes use of it in a creative form 
and takes into account the will and capac-
ity for its subjects to safeguard their heri-
tage. As will be shown, this does not turn 
out to be a mere functionalist approach to 
government, which may turn its subjects 
toward any desirable direction without 
fearing resistance or problems of “translat-
ing” programs into action. On the con-
trary: There are certainly spaces and pos-
sibilities of resisting governmental will and 
conduct, and parts of the Alevi movement 
in Turkey do have the capacity to continu-
ously challenge the nationalist, Sunni-
Turkist dominance. Yet there is reason to 
doubt whether the UNESCO language of 
Cultural Heritage is able to empower and 
represent the marginalized. This problem 
is also raised by Göner (129), who employs 
a Gramscian reading of the Alevi associa-
tions’ activities in their quest for recogni-
tion: She refers to the activities of some 
Alevi organizations, like the Karacaahmet 
Foundation in her example, as codifying 
the diverse Alevi belief system(s). The no-
tions of order and codification embedded 
in these endeavors, according to Göner, 
appropriate the very normative percep-
tions of religion held by the members of 
the majority, i.e. Sunni Muslims. In order to 
be represented as a religious group in its 
own, these activities subscribe to the he-
gemonic framework of religion which re-
quires, for example, a single written sa-
cred text. The aspect of consent to a 
hegemonic knowledge about oneself is 
central to this Gramscian approach to 
power and doubtlessly useful in coming 
to terms with the politics of representation 
on Alevis in Turkey. Although these 
thoughts on hegemony and an ostensibly 
voluntary consent to it (as its central char-
acteristic feature) also constitute to the 
backdrop for this paper’s analytical frame-
work, the approach followed here differs 
from a focus on hegemony in that it ana-
lyzes liberal government’s conduct as the 
practice of being made up of “citizens ca-
pable of bearing a kind of regulated free-
dom” (Rose; Miller 174). This understand-
ing comes to terms with the UNESCO’s 
perception of empowerment of “commu-
nities,” their intelligibility, and their repre-
sentation. Since Butler so powerfully un-
derlined an inescapable alliance of 
representation and coercion in Gender 
Trouble, critical investigations must be 
careful to attend to such narratives of rep-
resentation and empowerment. Also in 
the context of Heritage Studies, many 
scholars have emphasized the inherently 
political and bureaucratic character of her-
itage regimes and their capacity for iden-
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tity politics and nationalist aspirations for 
identifying and inscribing belonging 
(Smith “Archaeological Theory”; Ash-
worth). Analyzing and criticizing the con-
struction of a particular Turkish Alevi-
Bektaşi heritage and the paternalistic 
discourse involved may also empower fur-
ther critical reflections on ongoing subtle 
forms of surveillance and less subtle forms 
of physical violence in the field of identity 
politics and national engineering.
Alevi­Bektaşi Cultural Heritage: Issues 
and Actors
Every year, a committee consisting of 
members elected by the UNESCO Gen-
eral Assembly judges state parties’ pro-
posals for inscribing elements onto the 
“Representative List of Intangible Cultural 
Heritage” (UNESCO Convention). In 2010 
it granted the semah-dance, a sequence 
of the Alevi-Bektaşi cem-ritual, the status 
of ICH.3 There are five criteria that must be 
met in order to be granted inscription, 
among which is that the element “will con-
tribute to ensuring visibility and aware-
ness of the significance of the Intangible 
Cultural Heritage and to encouraging dia-
logue” and that it will be included in the 
National Inventory for Intangible Cultural 
Heritage (UNESCO Criteria). Although 
state parties are those that must apply for 
nomination, one of the criteria is also that 
the actors, groups, or communities con-
cerned should extensively participate in 
the application process (UNESCO Crite-
ria). This very aspect should raise a flag re-
garding the institutional requirements 
shaping heritage construction: As state 
actors are the ones in charge of applying 
to the UNESCO (in collaboration with “civ-
il” actors), it is their specific concepts of 
Cultural Heritage that may be accepted by 
UNESCO. Heritage thus most likely be-
comes an instrument of a nationalist agen-
da: In her work Uses of Heritage, Laura-
jane Smith underlined how political 
discourse on heritage has the potential to 
underpin certain communities’—spe-
cifically, those in political power—concepts 
of history, nationhood, and belonging (11).
This functional and strategic notion that 
heritage is “created as needed” (Ashworth 
26) is analytically useful in coming to terms 
with an Alevi-Bektaşi Cultural Heritage. 
Alevi communities in Turkey are in an am-
bivalent position: A Kemalist interpreta-
tion of the nation links Turkishness to Sun-
ni Islam, which excludes both Alevis as 
non-Sunni Muslims, as well as Kurdish-
speaking Alevis. As such, the Law on Der-
vish Lodges (Tekke ve Zaviye Kanunu) of 
1925 forbade all forms of religious orders 
and associated ritual practices, clothing, 
and titles. This has also had wide implica-
tions for Alevi ritual practice: Whereas 
mosques and imams, for example, are 
able to obtain public finance, Alevi cem 
evis are defined as “culture houses” and as 
such are not publicly fundable.4 In fact, this 
aspect of aspired-for equal citizenship 
(eşit yurttaşlık) is one of the main issues in 
the struggle for recognition of Alevi com-
munities in Turkey, as well as in the dias-
pora (Sökefeld 229). Additionally, Alevi 
children are required to participate in Sun-
na-conform religious education at school 
(din ve ahlak dersleri),5 and mosques are 
built in Alevi villages (Göner 118). On the 
other side of these assimilationist policies 
toward Alevism are a bevy of Alevi-Bektaşi 
cultural organizations which, in accor-
dance with the UNESCO Criteria, were 
also included in the application processes 
for their Cultural Heritage (UNESCO, 
Nomination file 14).6 And yet tolerating the 
work of these Alevi-Bektaşi NGOs does 
not render the communities recognized as 
religiously different subjects on a level that 
is institutionally equal to Sunni Islam.
This ambivalence is also connected to the 
question of whether Alevism is considered 
“culture” or “religion.” Recently, Massicard 
(107) has emphasized how Turkish polities 
like the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Di-
yanet) or the Ministry of Education con-
tinuously avoid referring to Alevism as a 
“religious minority.” In textbooks for the 
aforementioned compulsory religious ed-
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ucation in school for example, Alevism is 
rendered merely a mystical “interpretation 
in Islamic belief” (107) and is not consid-
ered as a school of belief in its own right 
(mezhep). The differences between Sunni 
Islamic and Alevi religious practices are, in 
line with the argumentation of the Presi-
dency of Religious Affairs, explained as 
cultural specificities due to geographical 
spread and the Alevis’ inhabiting rural 
landscapes far from urban centers (104). 
As another aspect of this policy of cultur-
alization, the Diyanet positioned itself as a 
promoter of Alevi cultural history and 
knowledge when it published texts like 
the hagiographies of the saint Hacı Bektaş 
in the series of Alevi-Bektaşi Klasikleri 
(Massicard 104). Likewise, since 1990 the 
Ministry of Culture and Tourism took over 
management of the annual Hacı Bektaş 
Festival that takes place at the Bektaşi 
tekke near Nevşehir (139). The rituals per-
formed there are also broadcast live on TV, 
but are promoted as part of Turkish heri-
tage, cultural diversity, and folklore, de-
linked to any notion of religious or theo-
logical deviance from Sunni Islam. 
Furthermore, the word “Alevi” does not 
appear at all in the 250-page volume on 
Religious Life in Turkey, issued by the Di-
yanet in the beginning of 2014.7 The men-
tioned study assimilates Alevism within 
the realm of Islam, and thus draws the con-
clusion that 99.2% of the Turkish popula-
tion is Muslim (XXX). Inner-Islamic differ-
ence is acknowledged along the lines of 
schools of thought, i.e. Maliki, Hanafi, 
Shafiʿi, Hanbali, and, additionally, the Shi-
ite Caferi (XXX).
Both of these measures—culturalization 
and annihilation—are examples of a type 
of political conduct toward Alevis that ar-
ranges and classifies a certain under-
standing of cultural difference and reli-
gious deviation. Although they allow for 
and promote some form of Alevi cultural 
expression, other, less-subtle forms of 
control continue to exist: The Ministry of 
the Interior regularly directs private televi-
sion stations on how to cover, for exam-
ple, cultural events like the Hacı Bektaş 
Festivalı or the Newroz celebrations, in-
cluding what kind of vocabulary to em-
ploy (Massicard 92).
The Alevi-Bektaşi semah-dance, which 
was rendered UNESCO ICH in 2010, also 
corresponds to this notion of a cultural 
rather than religious characterization of 
the Alevi-Bektaşi belief system: Although 
the ritual sequence depicts the Alevi-
Bektaşi understandings of God’s relation-
ship to human beings, this religious aspect 
has come to be ever more “de-sacralized” 
(Massicard 131). The semah-dance, as one 
part of the Alevi cem-ritual, has gained 
considerable importance over other ele-
ments of Alevi-Bektaşi ritual practice. Din-
çer stresses how rural urban migrations 
and the geographical diffusion of Alevi 
communities have had an immense im-
pact on the communities’ ritual practice 
since about the 1950s (35). Her fieldwork 
revealed that in urban cem-rituals (in Izmir 
and Istanbul), in which Alevis from various 
regions with different mother tongues and 
varying concepts of ethnic belonging par-
ticipate, the semah as one of the “twelve 
services” of the cem-ritual played a pre-
dominant role in relation to the other ritu-
al sequences (37). Motika and Langer also 
emphasize that in the public performance 
of rituals, some sequences are either omit-
ted or reduced to mere symbolic acts (99). 
Since the various forms of Alevism do not 
possess a canonizing religious apparatus, 
the religious character of the ritual is of-
tentimes downplayed when participants 
of different geographical, ethnic or lin-
guistic backgrounds gather for a ritual 
(Massicard 130). Likewise, when turned 
into a common Alevi-Bektaşi Cultural Her-
itage, the various forms of the ritual are 
interpreted as an “evident sign of the rich-
ness in semah culture” (UNESCO Nomina-
tion file 4) and not, for example, as an evi-
dent sign of the richness of diverse 
theological reflections other than those of 
Sunni Islam.
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Additionally, it is Intangible Cultural Heri-
tage that is sought in the recent UNESCO 
conventions. Thus, the institutional chan-
nels to articulate the demands of heritage 
and identity require a focus on rituals, as 
opposed to tangible artifacts of the past. 
This stress on semah as Alevi-Bektaşi heri-
tage is an example of how socio-religious 
developments within the Alevi communi-
ties are underpinned by the UNESCO dis-
course on Cultural Heritage: In this re-
spect, Massicard quite aptly speaks of 
“external- and self-folklorization” (130) be-
cause “culture,” on the one hand, serves as 
the “most consensual way of Alevi organi-
zations to foster belonging” (134). As Turk-
ish political discourse denies Alevism be-
ing thought of as a religious group of 
considerable size, some of the Alevi-
Bektaşi organizations explicitly promote 
cultural common denominators—such as 
the saz, poetry, or the semah—to amalgam-
ate various Alevi communities with differ-
ing notions of religious and ethnic coher-
ence (130). On the other hand, this cultural 
understanding of Alevism as Turkish folk-
lore corresponds to the patterns and un-
derstandings of the Diyanet about Ale-
vism, accommodating the very discourse 
that denies Alevis in Turkey their own reli-
gious education at public schools or state-
funded locales for religious devotion (cem 
evis) analogue to mosques.
There is yet another aspect of heritage 
policies that may provide insight into 
forms of political knowledge about Ale-
vism as Turkish folklore, concerning the 
naming as “Alevi-Bektaşi” of the Cultural 
Heritage. Strikingly, only four of the eigh-
teen NGOs involved in the heritage con-
struction operate under the heading 
“Alevi,” while others use names referring 
to the Saint Hacı Bektaş or to tribal asso-
ciations such as tahtacı (UNESCO Nomina-
tion file 13). These denominations again 
bear witness of the ambivalent standing of 
Alevis in Turkey, and to the specific char-
acter of a certain form of understanding of 
cultural difference: In the 1990s when most 
of these organizations were founded, it 
was generally not allowed to draw on 
names that could suggest a possible sep-
aration of the Turkish nation along reli-
gious, social, or ethnic lines (Sökefeld 231). 
Yet it was and is tolerated that these orga-
nizations may represent Alevi interests. 
The tight bond between “Alevi” and 
“Bektaşi” in many of these denominations 
and, in fact, in the naming of the ritual in 
question as “Alevi-Bektaşi” heritage, also 
denotes a certain form of state-controlled, 
domesticated difference: As Dressler has 
pointed out, the term Alevi-Bektaşi is used 
mostly by Turkish-speaking Alevis, which 
excludes Kurdish Alevis and with that the 
notion of the politically subversive charac-
ter of Alevism (25). Although Alevis and 
Bektaşis share many ritual practices and 
belief systems, and as such may be con-
ceived of as a single community, the term 
Alevi-Bektaşi also makes opaque the insti-
tutional, social, and geographic differenc-
es of both of these groups. A strong em-
phasis on an Alevi-Bektaşi synthesis may 
thus be read, according to Dressler, as a 
means of strengthening a certain Turkish-
Alevi agency in the Turkish public sphere 
by weakening the notion of social and cul-
tural differences between Turkish and 
Kurdish speaking Alevis in striving for the 
nationalist quest of unity (25).
Heritage and Determining Diversity
The support for an Alevi-Bektaşi Cultural 
Heritage is in accordance with a discourse 
that renders Alevism a cultural facet of 
Turkishness which, in turn, does not prin-
cipally deviate from Sunni Islam. This spe-
cific understanding of Alevism as folklore, 
“enriching” Turkey’s cultural diversity, is af-
firmed and put into play by the very mech-
anisms of Cultural Heritage management 
that include the element in question in the 
“National Inventory of Cultural Heritage.” 
The inscription signifies specific under-
standings of difference, but does not clash 
with the preserving and empowering na-
ture of heritage. On the contrary: It valo-
rizes this understanding of difference, 
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commodifies it, and renders it true by in-
scription. The policies of Cultural Heritage 
thus bear the limiting notion that though 
it recognizes and celebrates Turkey’s and 
the world’s cultural diversity on the one 
hand, this does not translate into de facto 
practice on the other. Recognition is thus 
only granted under the rubric of belong-
ing to a cultural minority that enriches Tur-
key’s cultural diversity, but that is—as heri-
tage—detached from serious political 
questions such as, for example, religious 
politics. Ashworth called this aspect of 
heritage policies “museumification” and 
“vernacularization”: Transforming, for ex-
ample, the dervish lodge in the city of Hacı 
Bektaş into a museum makes it into folk-
lore, detaches its subjects and their beliefs 
from the present, and renders them insig-
nificant in current struggles of political 
participation and resistance. Heritage as 
such has the power to signify as unimport-
ant ideas and practices that “could poten-
tially challenge or distract a dominant ide-
ology” (Ashworth 33) or challenge 
hegemonic demarcations of belonging. 
Strikingly, although the various sharehold-
er Alevi associations in the making of the 
ICH vary considerably in their political, re-
ligious, and cultural outlook, they never-
theless unite under a common Alevi Cul-
tural Heritage. Even such different actors 
as the Pir Sultan Abdal Association and the 
CEM Vakfı, as only two examples, are list-
ed among the “Concerned Communities 
organization(s)” in the UNESCO Nomina-
tion file (13), although both of them differ 
in their understanding of Alevism. The for-
mer has a rather state-critical, leftist out-
look, while the latter represents a form of 
Alevism within Islam and accords to cur-
rent Turkish polities (Massicard 49). In or-
der to bring such different actors together, 
the common Alevi heritage semah is also 
defined and appropriated to the different 
needs: Distinguishing between içeri and 
dışarı semah, the nomination file concep-
tualizes two ways of reading the ritual se-
quence: one more secular than the other. 
It is stated that içeri semah should be held 
in small circles only with faithful people at-
tending, whereas the dışarı semah under-
lines the cultural/folkloristic character of 
the dance (UNESCO Nomination file 5). 
The process called “museumification” is 
thus accompanied by an appropriation 
which renders the semah as representa-
tive both for the Alevi-Bektaşi associations 
and for the Turkish state, to which it be-
longs as Cultural Heritage.
This perspective challenges the liberal, 
activating, and empowering notions that 
Intangible Cultural Heritage brings to 
bear. Of course it seems that policies of 
ICH provide “indigenous communities,” to 
use the UNESCO language, with the 
agency “to act upon one’s own world” 
(Brosius and Polit 2). UNESCO’s discourse 
on Cultural Heritage provides language, 
frames of reference, and infrastructure for 
identity demands and recognition. Yet this 
very notion of the “self” must be called 
into question if we are to criticize the pa-
ternalistic political practices of represen-
tation in the context of an Alevi-Bektaşi 
Cultural Heritage. At this point, it is useful 
to recall a central element to the kind of 
political conduct that was analyzed here 
as governmentality: Rose argues in his 
Powers of Freedom that it is impossible to 
“counterpose subjectivity to power” (55). 
Linking practice and the conduct of sub-
jects and government in a web of power 
relations may also serve to help come to 
terms with the both empowering and lim-
iting aspects of Cultural Heritage de-
scribed above. The promotion of a certain 
kind of cultural diversity, as “domesticated 
diversity” (Göner 127), accords to this spe-
cific form of political conduct: Policies on 
Alevi-Bektaşi Cultural Heritage do not 
work as a kind of political power that 
would forbid, deny, or punish a certain 
form of Alevism by law or coercion. It rath-
er exercises its power via an assemblage 
of strategies that enhance and activate 
self-conduct, encouraged by the preserv-
ing, safeguarding, and self-directed no-
tion of heritage, along with UNESCO’s lan-
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guage of empowerment. Massicard 
points to this very “external and self-folk-
lorization” (130) in the practice of Alevi-
Bektaşi identity politics. Indeed, it corre-
sponds with a form of political conduct in 
which the technologies of government 
meet the technologies of the self—a form 
that refers to the “empowering” element 
of ICH discourse, as it places responsibil-
ity on the side of the individual, or the “in-
digenous communities.”
Yet the “vernacular” actors involved in the 
process are not merely physical bodies 
that may be imbued with a certain desir-
able form of conduct, identity, or self-
awareness. The selection of semah as her-
itage and its naming as Alevi-Bektaşi 
heritage underpin political and socio-eco-
nomic developments “within” the Alevi 
movement, and which are far older than 
heritage policies, which additionally were 
not set in motion by these political pro-
grams alone. Yet these interrelated pro-
cesses of governmental strategies ad-
dressing and meeting the technologies of 
the self are what characterize governmen-
tality as a form of political power.
Analyzing governmentalities of heritage 
thus allows going beyond an understand-
ing of politics in binaries such as domina-
tion and freedom, and also characterizes 
political power as dispersed among many 
different agents (Rose 2). It thus enlarges 
the perspective on minority politics of di-
versity management in the Republic of 
Turkey. Göner has characterized these di-
verse stages and forms of minority politics 
on Alevis in Turkey as “difference repres-
sive” and “difference blind.” In her argu-
ment, the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) consti-
tutes the beginning of these modes of 
thinking about minorities, since the treaty 
only grants non-Muslim religious groups 
such as Jews and Christians the status of 
minorities (112). Turkey’s polities, such as 
the Diyanet, thus embody forms of repres-
sion in that they represent a Sunni-Turkist 
idea of the nation. She further argues that 
European Union (EU) demands of recog-
nizing Alevis as a religious or cultural mi-
nority during the negotiations about Tur-
keys EU membership8 opened up a new 
space to articulate and promote Alevism 
in Turkey, as it invoked a new notion of cul-
tural diversity and minority rights. Al-
though this undermined the former “dif-
ference blind” and “difference repressive” 
nature, Göner also underlines how state 
policies supported only a certain notion of 
Alevism—i.e. Alevi-Bektashism, freed of a 
potentially Kurdish character and the po-
tential of political subversion. This new ap-
proach includes “difference but at the 
price of domesticating” it (127).
Göner’s article was published in 2005, 
long before the politics of heritage came 
to serve in a way she characterized as the 
“creative but not repressive nature of the 
new hegemonic discourse” (130), which is 
a form of political conduct that relies on a 
variety of actors and draws on the seman-
tics of enhancement and empowerment 
rather than repression. In the same way 
that the EU demands of recognizing Ale-
vism as a cultural/religious minority inter-
sected with national policies and pro-
duced a discursive frame of reference, the 
UNESCO’s endeavors to promote Cultur-
al Heritage also possess a certain capac-
ity to enhance citizens and civil groups in 
efforts to preserve their cultural practices 
and artifacts. Yet bureaucratic and institu-
tional limits as well as specific govern-
mentalities heavily shape this process, 
and limit the liberating and empowering 
nature of such politics. The “creative but 
not repressive nature of the new hege-
monic discourse” quite aptly encompass-
es the practice of Alevi-Bektaşi Cultural 
Heritage in Turkey, as their heritage sub-
scribes to a notion of alterity promoted by 
state-loyal institutions.
Concluding Remarks
The politics of Alevi-Bektaşi Cultural Heri-
tage in Turkey benefit from intergovern-
mental endeavors to promote and to safe-
guard humankind’s creativity and diversity. 
UNESCO provides a discursive frame to 
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which individual citizens and (“indigenous”) 
groups may refer in order to protect ob-
jects and practices perceived to be in dan-
ger of extinction. The policies of Intangible 
Cultural Heritage explicitly address civil 
and not state actors for their purposes, 
which various scholars see as a step toward 
empowering those groups, and undermin-
ing formerly state-oriented approaches to 
monumental heritage sites.
Undoubtedly, such intergovernmental bod-
ies and their politics of Intangible Cultural 
Heritage may help to promote some form 
of visibility for vernacular groups, or for oth-
er actors and their cultural assets. Though, 
as this analysis has shown, it is doubtful that 
these instruments help to raise awareness 
on the social and political problems faced 
by these very groups: The recognition of an 
Alevi-Bektaşi Cultural Heritage in Turkey 
neither translates into legal recognition of 
Alevism as a group that religiously differs 
from Sunni Islam, nor does it challenge the 
homogenizing nationalist discourse with its 
stress on Sunni-Turkist ideas of nationhood. 
The specific institutional settings in heritage 
regimes, in which states remain the most 
important actors in the carving out of heri-
tage, diversity articulated through Cultural 
Heritage in Turkey remains “domesticated” 
in that it is accommodated to the polity and 
to the requirements of hegemonic sets of 
knowledge on diversity.
An analysis of the governmentality of her-
itage reveals the particular political men-
talities and understandings of cultural di-
versity which are embodied in the very 
policies that promote these values. A form 
of government that includes these domi-
nant readings of reality harnesses the self-
conduct of its population within these dis-
cursively drawn lines of possibility. A 
pursuit of consent to this very order is at-
tained through liberal empowering no-
tions of agency and of safeguarding a 
heritage perceived to be in danger. Like-
wise, this form of conduct also heavily 
shapes ideas of what may be thought and 
said about Alevi-Bektaşi communities in 
Turkey: As Turkey’s Cultural Heritage, they 
are perceived of as a folkloric rather than 
a religious group that may subvert estab-
lished ideologies. “Recognizing” this heri-
tage is accompanied by forms of appro-
priation that make this Alevi-Bektaşi ritual 
representable and recognizable in the first 
place. The meaning and consequences of 
this recognition are powerfully prefigured 
by the very language of UNESCO and by 
the dominant understanding of pluralism 
salient in Turkish nationalist discourse. 
Thus, equipping the nation-state with a 
central role in the definition of its “vernac-
ular” heritage provides an opportunity to 
strongly shape and codify the understand-
ings of this vernacular, upon which the 
“communities” themselves may act. From 
this perspective, the assemblage of gov-
ernment produces the very subjects and 
specific understanding of difference that 
it comes to represent. The capacity “to act 
upon one’s own world”—as formulated by 
empowering notions of ICH—may thus be 
grasped as consent to a prefigured con-
cept of belonging rather than agency. As 
a result, the recognition of an Alevi-Bektaşi 
Cultural Heritage fails to translate into the 
legal-political realm, and turning semah 
into Cultural Heritage maintains its un-
equal status vis-à-vis Sunni Muslim forms 
of worship. Attempts to reach an equality 
of partners in the context of Sunni-Alevi 
relations, or in any “vernacular politics,” 
thus have to rely on other, less predeter-
mined vocabulary than the liberal empow-
ering notions of intergovernmental actors. 
A focus on government through enhance-
ment of certain desirable forms of con-
duct taken up here thus uncovers the pow-
er relations between government and 
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4 See, for example, the clear 
comment of Prime Minister 
Erdoğan on this issue: 
“Whichever Alevi I meet 
says, we were Muslims. The 
prayer place for Muslims is 
the mosque. Alevism is not 
a religion [din]. Therefore 
one cannot compare [Islam 
and Alevism]. If we made 
this distinction, why should 
we divide Turkey? One is a 
house for prayer; the other is 
a culture house. Cem houses 
cannot receive the same 
[financial] assistance that the 
mosques receive. If there 
is somebody who wants to 
support cem houses this 
cannot be hindered” (quoted 
in Sökefeld 245, highlights 
and additions there).
5 After a European Court 
of Human Rights decision, 
pupils may be exempt from 
the lessons. Yet every pupil 
requires for this a court 
order in his or her own 
right, which makes such an 
exemption both expensive 
and institutionally lavish.
Notes
1 The cem-ritual is a 
congregational ritual in Alevi 
ritual practice. It consists of 
various sequences, of which 
the dance sequence semah is 
but one part. For an overview 
on Alevi rituals, see Langer 
“Alevitische Rituale”; for an 
ideal-typical description of 
the ritual, see Karolewski.
2 The idea about fostering 
communities for the sake of 
governing is aptly termed 
by Rose in his Powers of 
Freedom as “government 
through community” (167).
3 The term “Alevi-Bektaşi” 
is not mine, but used by 
various organizations from 
this spectrum in heritage 
discourse. See UNESCO 
nomination file No. 00384. 
6 These are: Alevi-Bektaşi 
Federasyonu, Hacı Bektaş 
Veli Anadolu Kültür Vakfı 
Genel Merkezi, Hacı Bektaş 
Veli Kültürve Tanıtma 
Dernekleri Genel Merkezi, Pir 
Sultan Abdal Kültür Derneği 
Genel Merkezi, Pir Sultan 
Abdal 2 Temmuz Kültürve 
Eğitim Vakfı, Karacaahmet 
Sultan Eğitimve Kültür Vakfı, 
Cem Vakfı Genel Merkezi, 
Dünya Ehl-I Beyt Vakfı, Ankara 
Cem Kültür Evlerini Yaptırma 
Derneği, Hüseyin Gazi 
Derneği, Hubyar Sultan Alevi 
Kültür Derneği, Hacı Bektaş 
Derneği, İstanbul Alevi Kültür 
Derneği, Tahtacı Kültür Eğitim 
Kalkınmave Yardımlaşma 
Derneği, Turhal Kültürve 
Dayanışma Derneği, Gazi 
Üniversitesi Türk Kültürüve 
Hacı Bektaş Veli Araştırma 




7 Türkiye’de Dinî Hayat 
Araştırması. Diyanet İşleri 
Bakanlığı, Ankara, 2014. 
I thank the anonymous 
reviewer for this hint.
8 In fact the EU has shifted its 
demands and its language 
on demarcating difference 
over the course of time: As 
Dressler has shown, the EU 
since 2007 has refrained 
from defining Alevism as 
a religious minority, as the 
questions of Alevism being 
a religion or a culture, or 
being a religious tradition 
within Islam or outside of 
it, continue to be intensely 
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